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Behavioral Conflict and Fairness
in Social Networks
Stephen Judd1, Michael Kearns1, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik2
1 Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
2 Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA
Abstract. We report on a series of behavioral experiments in social
networks in which human subjects continuously choose to play either a
dominant role (called a King) or a submissive one (called a Pawn). Kings
receive a higher payoff rate, but only if all their network neighbors are
Pawns, and thus the maximum social welfare states correspond to maxi-
mum independent sets. We document that fairness is of vital importance
in driving interactions between players. First, we find that payoff dispar-
ities between network neighbors gives rise to conflict, and the specifics
depend on the network topology. However, allowing Kings to offer “tips”
or side payments to their neighbors substantially reduces conflict, and
consistently increases social welfare. Finally, we observe that tip reduc-
tions lead to increased conflict. We describe these and a broad set of
related findings.
1 Introduction
Reporting on a series of behavioral experiments involving a particular class of
coordination tasks on social networks, we demonstrate the central importance
of fairness and conflict in interactions between players which entail exclusively
financial consequences. The experiments were held in a single session with 36
human subjects, each controlling the state of a single node in an exogenously im-
posed social network. In our first set of experiments, each subject could choose to
be a King or a Pawn. A King is paid at a higher rate (twice as much as a Pawn),
but only if no network neighbor is in conflict with him or her by also having
chosen to be a King; a King in conflict receives no payments. Players can asyn-
chronously change their state at any time. Since only one of any two neighbors
can be a King for either to be paid, such a configuration is inherently “unfair”,
giving rise to considerable tensions between pure self-interest and fairness con-
siderations. Our second set of experiments thus involved an additional element:
Kings that had no conflicts were able to designate a tip (or side payment) which
was equally divided among their Pawn neighbors.
Networked King-Pawn games may broadly be seen as modeling economic
interactions in which each local neighborhood can support only one dominant
player. For example, in organized crime it is often the case that only one clan
or faction is permitted to rule a locality, and incursions against the incumbent
often result in violent clashes that are damaging to both sides. We may also
consider geographic sovereignty as an example — governments oversee property,
and attempts by neighboring nations to overtake that property may result in
costly wars.
A game theoretic understanding of dynamic coordination games such as these
offers several approaches. One considers a stylized one-shot game modeling a
long-run outcome, which in our setting exhibits no conflict in a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium, and in which any positive tip level is strictly dominated. An-
other is a repeated game model, with a concomitant explosion of equilibria.
Our behavioral results contradict the predictions of a one-shot model: tipping is
marked when allowed, and persists even at the end of games. A repeated game
model, on the other hand, has too many equilibria to offer a meaningful predic-
tion, and does not suggest any fundamental difference between our two settings.
In our experiments, on the other hand, we document numerous qualitative and
quantitative differences between the first (no tips) and the second (with tips)
settings.
One of our most notable observations is that social welfare is uniformly higher
when tips are allowed. Even if we allow that such outcomes are consistent with
some equilibrium of a repeated-game model, we must still appreciate why this,
and not another, equilibrium is ultimately chosen by human subjects. We argue
that (the lack of) perceived fairness is primarily responsible for the observed
differences between the two experimental settings: inequality in payoffs creates
considerable conflict in the first setting, and tips ameliorate conflict by bridging
the payoff gaps in the second setting. This finding is robust to the network
topology and has broad implications, including the suggestion that reducing
income inequality may actually raise social welfare. While there has been well-
documented evidence of the importance of fairness considerations in ultimatum
games [7, 4], we note that our setting involves global coordination on networks,
rather than bargaining, and it is not a priori clear that equity plays a role in
facilitating or hampering coordination.
A well-known theory in macroeconomics suggests that wages are resistant to
reduction, since people view reductions in their wages as inherently unfair even
if their real value is preserved [1]. Roughly mapping tips in our setting to wages,
we find behavioral evidence for this “downward rigidity”. Specifically, we observe
that for similar average tip levels, a tip reduction resulted in considerably more
conflict. Furthermore, we find that the amount of conflict in response to tip
reductions actually rises with average tip pay rate—higher earners appear to
respond more strongly to pay cuts.
The experiments described here are part of a broader and ongoing program
of behavioral experiments in strategic and economic interaction on social net-
works conducted at Penn [14, 11, 13], and are an effort to apply the methods of
behavioral game theory [6] to the study of social networks.
1.1 Related Literature
The games we study are networked generalizations of repeated or continuous ver-
sions of the game of Chicken or Hawk-Dove [9], 2-player instances and certain
generalizations of which have been studied extensively in the lab [15, 17, 3]. The
subject of fairness in human interactions has a very long history as well. Sociol-
ogists and social psychologists view it as central to many social phenomena, and
have well-developed theories of fair exchange and reciprocity (exchange/equity
theory) [5]. The economic experiments of Fehr and Ga¨chter [8] show that peo-
ple frequently punish non-altruistic behavior and derive pleasure from doing so.
Akerlof and Yellen develop a hypothesis of wage effort based on fairness con-
siderations [2] which allows them to offer an explanation of unemployment and
supports the general observation that wages tend to be downwardly rigid [1].
Rabin [18], Fehr and Schmidt [7], and Bolton and Ockenfels [4] offer alternative
theories that incorporates fairness into more traditional game theoretic models.
The term “social welfare” will be used here to mean the total payoff to
all players in a game. It is worth noting that maximizing the social welfare of
our game is isomorphic to the Maximum Independent Set problem, which is
a canonical NP-Complete problem [10]. In this study, we construct games in
such a way that a Pareto optimal pure strategy Nash equilibrium of its one-
shot version solves the maximum independent set problem. In that regard, this
work is similar to the experiments in which subjects were placed as nodes in
a graph and tasked with coordinating on a proper coloring—another canonical
NP-Complete problem [14, 12].
2 Experimental Design
In our experiments players were mapped to nodes on exogenously specified net-
works. Each player was given one of two action (role) choices: to be a King or
a Pawn. As a King, the player would enjoy a high pay rate ($1/minute), but
payments only accrue if none of his neighbors are also Kings. A conflict is a situ-
ation in which there are two neighbors both selecting King — and both earn zero.
Being a Pawn, in contrast, is risk-free: no matter what their neighbors choose,
Pawns earn a steady income, albeit only half of a King’s ($0.50/minute). Pay-
ments accrued continuously for each player, pro-rated by the time spent in each
of the three possible local states (King without conflicts, King with conflicts,
and Pawn). Players could asynchronously update their choices at any time.
A conflict-free configuration of Kings forms an independent set. Since Kings
are paid only when all their neighbors are Pawns, social welfare is maximized
when Kings form a maximum independent set, though computing such a maxi-
mum is NP-Hard in general.
We ran two variants of this basic King-Pawn scenario. The first was precisely
as described above. In the second, we allowed players to offer tips to each other.
Tips are payable only while a King is non-conflicting (i.e., he is a King and all
of his neighbors are Pawns), and when payable they are divided equally among
neighbors. Tip offer values were an amount between 0 and 100% of a King’s pay
rate, but were restricted to quantum steps of 10% (i.e., 10 cents/min). We call
this second scenario the “tips” setting, in contrast to the former, which we call
the “no-tips” setting.
A natural question to ask is whether allowing players to exchange tips is at all
consequential according to traditional game theory. Let us thus observe that in
the tips setting, non-conflicting Kings should never offer tips at Nash equilibrium
of a one-shot game corresponding to our setup. This observation also holds in
the last stage of finite repeated games. Since the experiments involve a known
time limit and our clock has a finite granularity, we can view them as finite-
period repeated games; in such a repeated game, positive tipping could indeed
occur even in a subgame perfect equilibrium (except in the last stage), since a
mixed strategy equilibrium of a stage game can offer a credible threat.
All experiments were held in a single session lasting multiple hours with 36
University of Pennsylvania students as participants. We ran two sets of 19 exper-
iments, one set for the no-tips and another for the tips setting. Each experiment
had a fixed network topology, and subjects were randomly assigned to nodes.
All experiments lasted exactly two minutes.
Fig. 1. A screenshot of a player’s GUI for the tips scenario. The central node represents
the player using the GUI. The numbers displayed near the circles indicate tip offers.
The slider designates a choice for the tip offer. The buttons at the bottom of the screen
allow a player to choose to be a king or a pawn. In the no-tips setting all allusions to
tips (including the slide bar and tip amounts near the nodes) are removed.
A screenshot of the tips GUI is shown in Figure 1; for the no-tips setting,
the tip rate bar was simply absent. Each player could see his neighbors and
relationships between them, as well as their role and tip choices, but could not
see relationships or actions of anyone else. All actions were asynchronous. Role
changes or tip adjustments could be made at any time during the game. The
session was closely proctored and physical partitions were erected to ensure no
communication between subjects.
In both the no-tips and the tips settings we ran three experiments each on
six network topologies (Bipartite, Preferential Attachment Tree, Dense Prefer-
Pairs Bipartite PA Tree Dense PA
Clique Chain Rewired Chain Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
Fig. 2. Sample network topologies used in experiments.
ential Attachment, Clique Chain, Rewired Chain, and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi) and a single
experiment on a Pairs topology. Visualizations of typical candidates from each
topology class are provided in Figure 2. If a specific topology is a class with a
stochastic generative model (i.e., one of Bipartite, Preferential Attachment Tree
or Dense Graph, Rewired Chain, and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Graph), we generated a dif-
ferent network in each of a set of three experiments on that topology, but used
the same graphs in both the no-tips and the tips settings. In the Preferential
Attachment (PA) Tree, each node that is added to the graph is connected to
exactly one existing node. In the Dense PA topology, a new node is connected
to three existing nodes. For Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs, we set the probability p of
an edge between two nodes to 0.15. Each of 102 edges in the Bipartite graphs
paired players uniformly at random. Rewired Chain starts with a Clique Chain
as a baseline and rerouts each intra-clique edge with probability 0.2. More de-
tailed descriptions and motivation for these and similar generative models can
be found in [16].
The clustering coefficient of networks is relevant to our results. It is defined
as the number of closed triplets divided by the number of connected triplets of
vertices. Figure 3 (left) and later bar plots organize the networks in increasing
value of their clustering coefficient. In figures throughout, we mark a network
by *** if the reported result or difference is significant with P < 0.01, while **
indicates P < 0.05, and * corresponds to P < 0.1 significance level. When such
a result is attributed to both the no-tips and tips settings, we marked the pair
with the lowest significance level observed.
3 Results
3.1 Collective Wealth and Tipping
Game-theoretic solutions (applied most directly) do not predict a fundamental
difference arising from allowing players to exchange tips. Figures 3 and 4, how-
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Fig. 3. Left: Achieved welfare (average payoff (proportion of optimum) per player per
minute) in the no-tips (black) and tips (white) settings; networks ordered from left to
right by clustering coefficient, which is also displayed above each set of bars. Right:
Average rate of earnings in each game. Each of the 19 networks is shown without aver-
aging into its replication group; all 19 of them fall above the gray triangle, indicating
uniform improvement in the tips setting. The + marks are located at the averages of
the replication groups. The shaded zones are where performance is below Pawn rate.
ever, demonstrate a systematic improvement in welfare under the tips setting.
The impact of tips on welfare varies greatly, and is substantial for some networks.
In Figure 3 (left) we report the relative social efficiencies (behaviorally re-
alized social welfare as a proportion of the theoretically optimal social welfare)
for the different network topologies (averaged over trials), under both the no-
tips and tips settings. Clique Chain, Rewired Chain, and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
exhibit the greatest payoff improvements under tips (around 15% of optimal wel-
fare). Note that these are also three of the four most clustered networks; more on
that later. The Pairs network — where there is no “network” per se but rather
18 separate one-on-one games — shows the least improvement, suggesting that
the social welfare benefits of tips increase with network complexity. Payoff im-
provements were significant (P < 0.05) in 5 of 7 network architectures (shown in
Figure 3, left), and overall improvement in welfare was significant with P < 0.01.
One may suggest that the reason for the improved outcomes in the tips setting
can be attributed to learning effects. To rule out this explanation, we correlated
the experiment sequence index with corresponding welfare outcome separately in
the no-tips and tips settings. The correlation coefficient was small in the no-tips
setting, somewhat larger when tips were allowed, but not statistically significant
in either case; it seems clear in any case that subjects had not learned to play
the game any better during the no-tips sequence.
Figure 3 (right) illustrates the absolute average rates of income for all 19
networks in each of the two settings. The PA trees stand out as being particu-
larly wealthy in both settings; the CliqueChains performed below Pawn level in
both settings. The ER graphs are all in the upper left quadrant; they all move
from sub-Pawn losers to relative winners when tips are allowed. This figure also
demonstrates that not only the averages, but all 19 individual network topologies
yielded higher social welfare under tips.
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Fig. 4. Left: The top two lines are the average pay rate (as a proportion of optimum)
over time in the two settings, averaged over all experiments. Their scale is on the left.
The bottom (thick) line is the tip rate, averaged over all tips experiments. Its scale is
on the right. Right: Distribution of tips, both offered and accepted.
Some of the aggregate dynamics (Figure 4, left) reveal the effects of tipping.
Average welfare improvement due to tips is persistent throughout the span of
experiment. Furthermore, we find that the use of tips, when allowed, is rather
substantial: tips accounted for 13% of all income in the tips setting. The lowest
curve in the figure shows the average tip rate offered by players over time (average
taken over all tips experiments). The tip rate is initialized to zero, but jumps
almost immediately after an experiment starts, and persists at around 20% for
the bulk of the experiment. It falls off gradually between 70 and 100 seconds and
then faster after the 100 second mark, but, even at the end of the experiments,
average tip rate persists at around 10%, well above equilibrium level.
We observe that welfare rises over the span of a game in both settings. Fur-
thermore, social welfare increases over the last 90 seconds, even as tipping de-
creases. This observation suggests an alternative hypothesis that tips serve as a
coordination device, similar to cheap talk, to help select an equilibrium. While
such an explanation seems difficult since it would require players to first coordi-
nate on a global meaning of tips in order to use it as a communication device, and
is further undermined by the observed persistence of non-negligible tipping at
the ends of games, we cannot fully rule it out given our experimental design. We
found no significant correlation between tip rates and experiment index within
the session, suggesting no long-term adaptation of tipping behavior.
Figure 4 (right) shows the amount of time tip sliders spent in each of the 11
possible states (averaged over all players and games). In the case of one King
adjacent to a single Pawn, the tip amount that divides the income equally is
25%. One of the modes in this histogram is slightly below that, at 20%. In the
vaguely similar setting of the Ultimatum Game [6] there is a mode of 30 or 40%,
also slightly below equitable.
Pa
irs
Bipa
rtite
PA T
ree
De
ns
e P
ACl
iqu
eC
ha
in
Re
wi
re
dC
ha
in
Er
do
s-
Re
ny
i
• no tipping
• tips allowed
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
average income disparity
co
n
fli
ct
!"#$"%
"#""%
"#$"%
&#""%
&#$"%
'#""%
'#$"%
(#""%
(#$"%
)#""%
!"
#$
%&
'(
$)
&$
**
"+
#'
,+
$-
."
$#
/'
,+#0"./'1*2'3#4%"&#$**'
5+'6"7*' 6"7*'*&"!+%
Fig. 5. Left: The connection between income disparity and conflict. Both quantities
are reduced when tips are allowed. Right: The connection (linear regression coefficient)
between income disparity and conflict (after normalizing both quantities) by network
class for the no-tips and tips settings.
3.2 Conflict and Fairness
Thus far we have established the substantial use of tips when available, and
their consistent improvement of social welfare. But what behavioral processes
underly these phenomena? Here we propose and support the following hypoth-
esis: Subjects used conflict — which reduces the wealth of all players involved
— to express perceived unfairness or inequality. Tipping reduces unfairness and
consequently reduces conflict, thereby raising the average payoffs of all players
and facilitating coordination.
We begin this analysis by contrasting quantitative measures of income in-
equality between the no-tips and tips scenarios. Consider first just the horizon-
tal axis of Figure 5 (left), which measures average income disparity (defined as
the average squared difference in payoffs between network neighbors). Since tip
levels persist well above zero, and that money is being routed to other play-
ers, it is significant and unsurprising that income disparity falls when tipping
is allowed. What is more interesting is that tipping appears to roughly equalize
payoff asymmetries across networks, which were substantially more variable in
the no-tips case. For example, PA Tree networks that had shown large income
inequality in the no-tips setting are now much closer to other network types. We
found a significant correlation (0.49, P < 0.04) between income disparity under
the no-tips setting and tips exchanged when they are allowed. Our interpretation
is that the more a game is perceived as unfair, the greater the role that tips must
play in bridging income gaps between players.
The role of tipping in reducing income inequality is only one part of our
hypothesis. Additionally, we posit that conflict expresses a perception of unfair-
ness. Since tips reduce inequity, we propose that they alleviate the tension that
leads to conflict; thus, tips effectively replace or substitute for conflict when they
bridge inequality gaps. To support the idea that tips substitute for conflict, we
expect to see substantial reduction in conflict between players when tips are
allowed. Figure 5 (left) shows this on its vertical axis: the amount of conflict
between players (specifically, the average proportion of the game that a player
spent in conflict, with average taken over players and games) is systematically
lower in the tips setting. Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish a clear relation-
ship between income disparity and conflict. We conjecture that what matters is
perceived, rather than observed (or measured) unfairness, as suggested by equity
theory [5]. For example, it may seem fair that low degree nodes receive higher
income due to the natural advantage their network position offers. We can test
this conjecture by considering the correlation between income inequality or con-
flict with average disparity of degrees between network neighbors; however, we
did not find such correlations to be significant in our setting. Instead, we found
that the clustering coefficient exhibited significant correlation with time players
spent in conflict in the no-tips setting (0.62, P -value < 0.01); correlation be-
tween the same quantities is considerably smaller and not significant in the tips
setting.
As more direct support that conflict communicates perceived unfairness, we
looked at individual level correlations between the time that a player spends in
conflict that he initiates and ultimately terminates, and that player’s perceived
income disparity, defined as zero when his income is higher than a neighbor’s and
the squared payoff difference otherwise, and averaged over all of his neighbors.3
The correlation between these quantities is 0.345 (P < 0.001) in the no-tips
setting and 0.25 (P < 0.001) in the tips setting. These correlations suggest
that when players perceive unfairness in their predicament, they are much more
likely to engage in conflict with neighbors. On the other hand, the correlation is
markedly weaker in the tips setting, providing further evidence for substitution
between conflict and tips. One may hypothesize that conflict serves the purpose
of punishment to motivate coordinated, better outcomes, similar to Prisoner’s
Dilemma; below we refute this by showing that conflict decidedly does not pay.
We next consider again the correlation between perceived income inequality
and conflict, separated by individual network. However, rather than simply look-
ing at correlations between the two quantities, we regress time a player spends
in conflict on his perceived income disparity. In Figure 5 (right) we report the
regression coefficient. The figure does not appear to exhibit much systematic
difference in the linear relationship between conflict and perceived income dis-
parity across networks. While there does appear to be a slight negative trend
as the clustering coefficient increases in the no-tips setting, we did not find it
to be statistically significant. Nevertheless, the relationship is clearly positive—
significantly so in all graph classes except “Pairs”.
Conflict appears to also serve as a means of tip bargaining. Let C be the
time (in seconds) that a player spends in conflict that he both initiates and
terminates. Define T as tip income rate, that is, average tip income per minute
that a player spends as a Pawn. Let W be the wealth of a player for the entire
game. The correlation between C and T is 0.19 (P < 0.001), while the correlation
between C and W is −0.51 (P < 0.001). The positive correlation between C and
T generalizes across 5 of 7 network architectures (significant in all 5); the only
exceptions are Clique Chain and Rewired Chain. Thus, while conflict may show
3 This definition of fairness closely mirrors the notion introduced by Fehr and
Schmidt [7].
some success in negotiating a higher tip income rate, it yields an unambiguous
loss in the long run.
To quantify the tradeoff between time spent in conflict and tip income rate,
as well as conflict and wealth, we fit linear regression models to both sets of
data pairs. We find (with coefficients having P < 0.001) that every second that
a player engages his neighbors in conflict earns him (on average) an additional
0.2 cents in tips. Regressing wealth against conflict, on the other hand, tells us
(with even higher significance for both regression coefficients) that every second
in conflict costs a player 1.2 cents on average. The struggle for a bigger tip yields
meager rewards and ultimately costs a player more than it is worth.
3.3 Downward Rigidity of Tips
One explanation of high unemployment offered in macroeconomic theory posits
that wages are downwardly rigid, as people view wage decreases as unfair, even if
these decreases maintain the real value of wages (e.g., when there is deflation) [2,
1]. As a result, employers prefer to offer above-market wages to ensure that
worker productivity remains high; what results is a shortage of jobs relative to
the number of people seeking work.
There is a suggestion in Figure 4 (left) that tip changes are downwardly
rigid. After being quickly established at the 20% level, they are very slow to
head toward equilibrium level and never fall even half way back to zero.
Figure 6 (left) supports the hypothesis that downward changes are viewed
as unfair more directly. The comparisons in the figure are between players who
made at least one tip reduction and those who made none. The players who
did make a tip reduction suffered more conflict than those who did not, even as
average tip income rates were roughly equal between the groups. Additionally, as
tip rates increase, tip reductions actually entail more, not less, conflict. To test
the significance of this, we looked at finer discretized tip income rate intervals
and correlated midpoints of these with average increases in conflict time. The
resulting correlation was 0.99 and highly significant (P < 0.001). This result
cannot be explained by suggesting that higher tippers also made greater tip
reductions: we found no significant correlation between tip pay rate and average
size of a tip cut.
3.4 Individual Nodes
The previous discussion pertains to the communal patterns of behavior, but
there were also interesting variations at the level of individual nodes.
One natural question to ask is whether a node’s degree had an impact on
its wealth and role choices. We found significant negative correlation between
a node’s degree and wealth in both settings (correlation of -0.33 in the no-
tips setting, -0.26 in the tips setting, both with P < 0.001). Thus, having a
high degree was, overall, a handicap. However, breaking this down by network
class (Figure 6, right) we find that the negative relationship between degree and
income is only significant in three networks (PA Tree, Erdos-Renyi, and Dense
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Fig. 6. Left: Average time in conflict at similar average tip pay rates with (black) and
without (white) a negative tip change. Right: The connection (linear regression coeffi-
cient) between degree and income by network class for the no-tips and tips settings.
PA) in the no-tips setting and in only the first two in the tips setting. This is
not too surprising: all the preferential attachment networks exhibit relatively
low degree variation, and in rewired and clique chain graphs it is even less.
Nodes with a high degree spent considerably less time as King (correlation
is -0.37 in the no-tips and -0.4 in the tips settings, both with P < 0.001). This
finding is consistent across network classes. In contrast, the total time spent as
King had significant positive correlation with wealth overall, 0.18 in the no-tips
setting and 0.31 in the tips experiments (P < 0.001 in both). However, this
conclusion is somewhat nuanced when dissected by network class: in 4 of the 7
network classes, the relationship between time spent as King and wealth is clearly
positive in at least one of the game settings (no-tips or tips), but it is highly
significant and negative in the two most highly clustered networks, rewired and
clique chain. Thus, while generally being a King carries an advantage, it is more
trouble than it’s worth in highly clustered networks (presumably, because Kings
face far too much conflict there from other neighbors vying for power).
While high degree nodes had a disadvantage, they were partially compensated
for their handicap when tipping was allowed: the correlation between degree and
tip income was 0.27 (P < 0.001); they naturally also dished out significantly less
in tips to their neighbors (correlation between degree and tips paid was -0.23
with P < 0.01). Both these findings are consistent across network topologies.
4 Conclusion
One of our key observations is that allowing players to exchange tips substan-
tially increases social welfare. Furthermore, we note that although conflict is
clearly damaging to all parties, players systematically engage in it, although
substantially less when tipping is allowed. We explain the impact of tipping on
the amount of conflict between players by noting that tips equalize incomes be-
tween network neighbors. When players view their neighbors’ income as unfairly
higher than theirs, they engage in conflict, perhaps to punish the high earners.
Greater equality in wealth therefore reduces the propensity to engage neighbors
in conflict.
Since tip exchanges are pure transfers of wealth in our setting, classical eco-
nomic theory would not anticipate any impact of tips on average profits. It is
thus rather remarkable that tipping raises social welfare in our experiments. The
positive welfare impact of tipping (and greater equality of wealth distribution)
has considerable implications for policy, as it suggests that bridging income in-
equality may raise social welfare. Alternatively, our findings suggest that when
compensation, resources, or tasks are distributed unequally, transfers of money
or gifts may go a long way in alleviating interpersonal conflict.
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